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This paper studies government subsidies for green technology adoption while considering the manufacturing
industry’s response. Government subsidies offered directly to consumers impact the supplier’s production and
pricing decisions. Our analysis expands the current understanding of the price-setting newsvendor model,
incorporating the external influence from the government who is now an additional player in the system. We
quantify how demand uncertainty impacts the various players (government, industry and consumers) when
designing policies. We further show that for convex demand functions, an increase in demand uncertainty
leads to higher production quantities and lower prices, resulting in lower profits for the supplier. With this
in mind, one could expect consumer surplus to increase with uncertainty. In fact, we show this is not always
the case and the uncertainty impact on consumer surplus depends on the trade-off between lower prices and
the possibility of under-serving customers with high valuations. We also show that when policy makers such
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1. Introduction
Recent developments in green technologies have captured the interest of the public and private
sectors. For example, electric vehicles (EV) historically predate gasoline vehicles, but have only
received significant interest in the last decade (see Eberle and Helmot (2010) for an overview).
In the height of the economic recession, the US government passed the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009 which granted a tax credit for consumers who purchased electric vehicles.
Besides boosting the US economy, this particular tax incentive was aimed at fostering further
research and scale economies in the nascent electric vehicle industry. In December 2010, the all-
electric car, Nissan Leaf, and the plug-in hybrid General Motors’ Chevy Volt were both introduced
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in the US market. After a slow first year, sales started to pick up and most major car companies
are now in the process of launching their own versions of electric vehicles.
More recently in 2012, Honda introduced the Fit EV model and observed low customer demand.
After offering sizable leasing discounts, Honda quickly sold out in Southern California1. It is not
uncommon to read about waitlists for Tesla’s new Model S or the Fiat 500e, while other EVs are
sitting unwanted in dealer parking lots. Both stories of supply shortages or oversupply have been
commonly attributed to electric vehicle sales. At the root cause of both these problems is demand
uncertainty. Sallee (2011) studied the supply shortages and customer wait lists shortly after Toyota
launched the hybrid electric Prius in 2002. When launching a new product, it is hard to know
how many units customers will request. In addition, finding the correct price point is also not a
trivial task, especially with the presence of a government subsidy. In fact, understanding demand
uncertainty should be a first order consideration for both manufacturers and policy-makers alike.
For the most part, the subsidy design literature in green technologies has not studied demand
uncertainty (see for example, Benthem et al. (2008), Atasu et al. (2009), Lobel and Perakis (2013)
and Alizamir et al. (2013)). In practice, demand uncertainty has also often been not considered.
As suggested in private communication with several sponsors of the MIT Energy Initiative2, policy
makers often ignore demand uncertainty when designing consumer subsidies for green technology
adoption3. The purpose of this paper is to study whether incorporating demand uncertainty in
the design of subsidy programs for green technologies is important. In particular, we examine how
governments should set subsidies when considering the manufacturing industry’s response under
demand uncertainty. We show that demand uncertainty plays a significant role in the system’s
welfare distribution and should not be overlooked.
Consider the following two examples of green technologies: electric vehicles and solar panels. By
the end of 2013, more than 10GW of solar photovoltaic (PV) panels had been installed in the
United States, producing an annual amount of electricity roughly equivalent to two Hoover Dams.
While still an expensive generation technology, this large level of installation was only accomplished
due to the support of local and federal subsidy programs, such as the SunShot Initiative. In 2011,
the US energy secretary Steven Chu announced that the goal of the SunShot Initiative by 2020
is to reduce the total cost of PV systems by 75%, or an equivalent of $1 a Watt (DOE 2012), at
which point solar technology will be competitive with traditional sources of electricity generation.
1 Electric vehicles in short supply - Los Angeles Times - 06/05/2013 -
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jun/05/autos/la-fi-hy-autos-electric-cars-sold-out-20130605
2 http://mitei.mit.edu/about/external-advisory-board
3 Incentives for green technology adoption - Energy Futures, MIT Energy Initiative -
http://mitei.mit.edu/news/incentives-green-technology-adoption-getting-government-subsidies-right
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Even before this federal initiative, many states have been actively promoting solar technology with
consumer subsidies in the form of tax rebates or renewable energy credits.
Similarly, federal subsidies were also introduced to stimulate the adoption of electric vehicles
through the Recovery Act. As we previously mentioned, General Motors and Nissan have recently
introduced affordable electric vehicles in the US market. GM’s Chevy Volt was awarded the most
fuel-efficient compact car with a gasoline engine sold in the US, as rated by the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA (2012)). However, the price tag of the Chevy Volt is still
considered high for its category. The cumulative sales of the Chevy Volt in the US since it was
launched in December 2010 until September 2013 amount to 48,218. It is likely that the $7,500
government subsidy offered to each buyer through federal tax credit played a significant role in the
sales volume. The manufacturer’s suggested retail price (MSRP) of GM’s Chevy Volt in September
2013 was $39,145 but the consumer was eligible for $7,500 tax rebates so that the effective price
reduced to $31,645. The amount of consumer subsidies has remained constant since launch in
December 2010 until the end of 2013. This seems to suggest that in order to isolate the impact of
demand uncertainty without complicating the model, it is reasonable to consider a single period
setting.
In this paper, we address the following questions. How should governments design green subsidies
when facing an uncertain consumer market? How does the uncertain demand and subsidy policy
decision affect the supplier’s price (MSRP) and production quantities? Finally, what is the resulting
effect on consumers? In practice, policy makers often ignore demand uncertainty and consider
average values when designing consumer subsidies. This ignorance may be caused by the absence (or
high cost) of reliable data, among other reasons. We are interested in understanding how the optimal
subsidy levels, prices and production quantities as well as consumer surplus are affected when one
explicitly considers demand uncertainty relative to the case when demand is approximated by its
deterministic average value.
While the government designs subsidies to stimulate the adoption of new technologies, the man-
ufacturing industry responds to these policies with the goal of maximizing its own profit. In this
paper, we model the supplier as a price-setting newsvendor that responds optimally to the gov-
ernment subsidy. More specifically, the supplier adjusts its production and price depending on the
level of consumer subsidies offered by the government to the consumer. This study also helps us
to expand the price-setting newsvendor model while accounting for the external influence of the
government.
In our model, the government is assumed to have a given adoption target for the technology.
This is motivated by several examples of policy targets for electric vehicles and solar panels. For
instance, in the 2011 State of the Union, US President Barack Obama mentioned the following goal:
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“With more research and incentives, we can break our dependence on oil with bio-fuels and become
the first country to have a million electric vehicles on the road by 2015” (DOE 2011). Another
example of such adoption target has been set for solar panels in the California Solar Incentive
(CSI) program, which states that: “The CSI program has a total budget of $2.167 billion between
2007 and 2016 and a goal to install approximately 1,940 MW of new solar generation capacity”
(CSI 2007). Hence, in our model, we optimize the subsidy level to achieve a given adoption target
level while minimizing government expenditure. In Section 3, we discuss alternative models for the
government (such as maximizing the total welfare) as well as consider the subsidy program budget,
emission reductions and social welfare.
We then quantify the impact of demand uncertainty on government expenditures, firm profit
and consumer surplus. We further characterize who bears the cost of uncertainty depending on
the structure of the demand model. Finally, we study the supply-chain coordination i.e., when
the government owns the supplier, and show that subsidies coordinate the overall system. More
precisely, we show that the price paid by consumers as well as the production level coincide in both
the centralized (where the supplier is managed/owned by the government) and the decentralized
models (where supplier and government act separately).
Contributions
Given the recent growth of green technologies, supported by governmental subsidy programs, this
paper explores a timely problem in supply chain management. Understanding how demand uncer-
tainty affects subsidy costs, as well as the economic surplus of suppliers and consumers, is an
important part of designing sensible subsidy programs. The main contributions of this paper are:
• Demand uncertainty does not always benefit consumers: Nonlinearity plays a key role.
As uncertainty increases, quantities produced increase whereas the price and the supplier’s profit
decrease. In general, demand uncertainty benefits consumers in terms of effective price and quanti-
ties. One might hence expect the aggregate consumer surplus to increase with uncertainty. In fact,
we show this is not always true. We observe that the effect of uncertainty on consumer surplus
depends on the demand form. For example, for linear demand, uncertainty increases the consumer
surplus, whereas for iso-elastic demand the opposite result holds. Depending on the demand pat-
tern, the possibility of not serving customers with high valuations can outweigh the benefit of
reduced prices for the customers served.
• By ignoring demand uncertainty, the government will under-subsidize and miss the desired
adoption target.
Through the case of the newly introduced Chevy Volt by General Motors in the US market, we
measure by how much the government misses the adoption target by ignoring demand uncertainty.
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We show that when the supplier takes into account demand uncertainty information while the
government considers only average information on demand, the resulting expected sales can be
significantly below the desired target adoption level.
• The cost of demand uncertainty is shared between the supplier and the government.
We analyze who bears the cost of demand uncertainty between government and supplier, which
we show depends on the profit margin of the product. In general, the government expenditure
increases with the added inventory risk. For linear demand models, the cost of demand uncertainty
shifts from the government to the supplier as the adoption target increases or the production cost
decreases.
• Consumer subsidies are a sufficient mechanism to coordinate the government and the supplier.
We compare the optimal policies to the case where a central planner manages jointly the supplier
and the government. We determine that the price paid by the consumers and the production levels
coincide for both the decentralized and the centralized models. In other words, consumer subsidies
coordinate the supply-chain in terms of price and quantities.
2. Literature Review
Our setting is related to the newsvendor problem which has been extensively studied in the lit-
erature (see, e.g., Zipkin (2000), Porteus (1990), Winston (1994) and the references therein). An
interesting extension that is even more related to this research is the price-setting newsvendor (see
Petruzzi and Dada (1999) and Yao et al. (2006)). More recently, Kocabıyıkog˘lu and Popescu (2011)
identified a new measure of demand elasticity, the elasticity of the lost sales rate, to generalize
and complement assumptions commonly made in the price-setting newsvendor. Kaya and O¨zer
(2012) provide a good survey of the literature on inventory risk sharing in a supply chain with a
newsvendor-like retailer, which is closer to our framework. Nevertheless, our problem involves an
additional player (the government) that interacts with the supplier’s decisions and complicates the
analysis and insights. Most previous works on the stochastic newsvendor problem treat the additive
and multiplicative models separately (e.g., in Petruzzi and Dada (1999)) or focus exclusively on one
case, with often different conclusions regarding the price of demand uncertainty. In our problem
however, we show that our conclusions hold for both demand models.
In the traditional newsvendor setting, the production cost is generally seen as the variable cost of
producing an extra unit from raw material to finished good. In capital-intensive industries like solar
panels and electric vehicles, the per-unit cost of capacity investment in the manufacturing facility
is usually much larger than the per-unit variable cost. For this reason, we define the production
quantities decision of the supplier in a way that includes both the capacity investment decision
and the unit production, similar to Cachon and Lariviere (1999).
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Another stream of research related to our paper considers social welfare and government subsidies
in the area of vaccines (see, e.g., Arifoglu et al. (2012), Mamani et al. (2011) and Taylor and Xiao
(2013)). In Arifoglu et al. (2012), the authors study the impact of yield uncertainty, in a model that
represents both supply and demand, on the inefficiency in the influenza vaccine supply chain. They
show that the equilibrium demand can be greater than the socially optimal demand. In Taylor
and Xiao (2013), the authors assume a single supplier with stochastic demand and consider how a
donor can use sales and purchase subsidies to improve the availability of vaccines.
Among papers that study the design of subsidies for green technologies, Carlsson and Johansson-
Stenman (2003) examine the social benefits of electric vehicle adoption in Sweden and report a
pessimistic outlook for this technology in the context of net social welfare. Avci et al. (2013) show
that adoption of electric vehicles has societal and environmental benefits, as long as the electricity
grid is sufficiently clean. In Benthem et al. (2008), the authors develop a model for optimizing
social welfare with solar subsidy policies in California. These two papers assume non-strategic
industry players. While considering the manufacturer’s response, Atasu et al. (2009) study the use
of a take-back subsidy and product recycling programs. In a similar way as the previous papers
mentioned above, they optimize social welfare of the system assuming a known environmental
impact of the product. Our work focuses on designing optimal policies to achieve a given adoption
target level, which can be used to evaluate the welfare distribution in the system. In this paper,
we also incorporate the strategic response of the industry into the policy making decision. Also
considering an adoption level objective, Lobel and Perakis (2013) study the problem of optimizing
subsidy policies for solar panels and present an empirical study of the German solar market. The
paper shows evidence that the current feed-in-tariff system used in Germany might not be efficiently
using the positive network externalities of early adopters. Alizamir et al. (2013) also tackle the
feed-in-tariff design problem, comparing strategies for welfare maximization and adoptions targets.
Finally, Ovchinnikov and Raz (2013) present a price setting newsvendor model for the case of
public interest goods. The authors compare, for the case of linear demand, different government
intervention mechanisms and study under what conditions the system is coordinated in terms of
welfare, prices and supply quantities. On the other hand, in this paper we investigate the impact
of demand uncertainty on the various players of the system for non-linear demands and model
explicitly the strategic response of the manufacturer to the subsidy policy.
Numerous papers in supply-chain management focus on linear demand functions. Examples
include Anand et al. (2008) and Erhun et al. (2011) and the references therein. These papers study
supply chain contracts where the treatment mainly focuses on linear inverse demand curves. In
this paper, we show that the impact of demand uncertainty on the optimal policies differs for
some classes of non-linear demand functions relative to linear models. In particular, we observe
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that the effect of demand uncertainty depends on whether demand is convex (rather than linear)
with respect to the price. In addition, the demand non-linearity plays a key role on the consumer
surplus.
As mentioned before, our paper also contributes to the literature on supply chain coordination
(see Cachon 2003 for a review). The typical supply chain setting deals with a supplier and a retailer,
who act independently to maximize individual profits. Mechanisms such as rebates (Taylor 2002) or
revenue-sharing (Cachon and Lariviere 2005) can coordinate the players to optimize the aggregate
surplus in the supply chain. Liu and O¨zer (2010) examine how wholesale price, quantity flexibility
or buybacks can incentivize information sharing when introducing a new product with uncertain
demand. Lutze and O¨zer (2008) study how a supplier should share demand uncertainty risk with
the retailer when there is a lead-time contract. In Granot and Yin (2005, 2007, 2008), the authors
study different types of contracts in a Stackelberg framework using a price-setting newsvendor
model. In particular, Granot and Yin (2008) analyze the effect of price and order postponements in
a decentralized newsvendor model with multiplicative demand, wherein the manufacturer possibly
offers a buyback rate. In our setting, the government and the supplier are acting independently
and could perhaps adversely affect one another. Instead, we show that the subsidy mechanism is
sufficient to achieve a coordinated outcome. Chick et al. (2008) and Mamani et al. (2011) have
looked at supply chain coordination in government subsidies for vaccines. Nevertheless, as we
discussed above the two supply chains are fairly different.
Without considering demand uncertainty, there is a significant amount of empirical work in the
economics literature on the effectiveness of subsidy policies for hybrid and electric vehicles. For
example, Diamond (2009) shows that there is a strong relationship between gasoline prices and
hybrid adoption. Chandra et al. (2010) show that hybrid car rebates in Canada created a crowding
out of other fuel efficient vehicles in the market. Gallagher and Muehlegger (2011) argue that sales
tax waivers are more effective than income tax credits for hybrid cars. The increase in hybrid
car sales from 2000-2006 is mostly explained by social preferences and increasing gasoline prices.
Aghion et al. (2012) show that the auto industry innovates more in clean technologies when fuel
prices are higher. Jenn et al. (2013) determine that incentives are only effective when the amount
is sufficiently large. For plug-in electric cars, Sierzchula et al. (2014) argue that financial incentives,
charging infrastructure, and local presence of production facilities are strongly correlated with
electric vehicle adoption rates across different countries.
Also in economics literature, one can find a vast amount of papers that consider welfare implica-
tions and regulations for a monopolist (see, e.g., Train (1991)). There is also a relevant stream of
literature on market equilibrium models for new product introduction (see, e.g., Huang and Sosˇic´
(2010)). However, most of these papers do not consider demand uncertainty.
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The issue of how demand uncertainty creates a mismatch in supply and demand has been
mostly researched in the operations management literature, therefore we mainly focus our literature
survey in this area. There are some exceptions in economics, such as Sallee (2011), who essentially
argues that consumers captured most of the incentives for the Toyota Prius, while the firm did not
appropriate any of that surplus despite a binding production constraint. Sallee (2011) shows that
there was a shortage of vehicles manufactured to meet demand when the Prius was launched. This
reinforces our motivation for studying a newsvendor model in this context.
Also considering demand uncertainty, Fujimoto and Park (1997) show that an export subsidy
(as opposed to a tax) is the equilibrium government strategy for a duopoly where each firm is
in a different country and is uncertain about demand in the other country. In a slightly different
setting, Boadway and Wildasin (1990) argue that subsidies can be used to protect workers from
uncertain industry shocks, when there is limited labor mobility.
Some works on electricity peak-load pricing and capacity investments address the stochastic
demand case (see Crew et al. (1995) for a review on that topic). In this context, it is usually
assumed that the supplier knows the willingness to pay of customers and can therefore decline the
ones with the lowest valuations in the case of a stock-out. In our application however, one cannot
impose such assumption and the demand model follows a general price dependent curve while the
customers arrive randomly and are served according to a first-come-first-serve logic.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 3, we describe the model. In
Section 4, we consider both additive and multiplicative demand with pricing (price setter model),
analyze special cases and finally study the effect of demand uncertainty on consumer surplus.
In Section 5, we study the supply-chain coordination and Section 6 considers a different mecha-
nism where the government subsidizes the manufacturer’s cost. Finally, Section 7 presents some
computational results and our conclusions are reported in Section 8. The proofs of the different
propositions and theorems together with the price taker case are relegated to the Appendix.
3. Model
We model the problem as a two-stage Stackelberg game where the government is the leader and the
supplier is the follower (see Figure 1). We assume a single time period model with a unique supplier
and consider a full information setting. The government decides the subsidy level r per product and
the supplier follows by setting the price p and production quantities q to maximize his/her profit.
The subsidy r is offered from the government directly to the end consumer. We consider a general
stochastic demand function that depends on the effective price paid by consumers, z = p− r, and
on a random variable , denoted by D(z, ). Once demand is realized, the sales level is determined
by the minimum of supply and demand, that is, min(q,D(z, )).
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Figure 1 Order of events: 1. Subsidies; 2. Price and Quantity; 3. Sales
The selling price p can be viewed as the manufacturer’s suggested retail price (MSRP) that is,
the price the manufacturer recommends for retail. Additionally, in industries where production lead
time is long and incurs large fixed costs, we consider the production quantities to be equivalent to
the capacity investment built in the manufacturing facility.
The goal of our model is to study the overall impact of demand uncertainty. In order to iso-
late this effect, we consider a single period monopolist model. These modeling assumptions are
reasonable approximations for the Chevy Volt, which we use in our numerical analysis. Note that
since the introduction of electric vehicles, the MSRP for the Chevy Volt and the subsidy level have
remained fairly stable. Consumer subsidies were posted before the introduction of these products
and have remained unchanged ($7,500) since it was launched in December 2010. We assume the
supplier is aware of the amount of subsidy offered to consumers before starting production. The
supplier modeling choice is motivated by the fact that consumer subsidies for EVs started at a
time where very few competitors were present in the market and the product offerings were signif-
icantly different. The Chevy Volt is an extended-range mid-priced vehicle, while the Nissan Leaf
is a cheaper all-electric alternative and the Tesla Roadster is a luxury sports car. These products
are also significantly different from traditional gasoline engine vehicles so that they can be viewed
as price setting firms within their own niche markets.
Given a marginal unit cost, c, and consumer subsidy level, r, announced by the government, the
supplier faces the following profit maximization problem.
Π = max
q,p
p ·E[min(q,D(z, ))]− c · q (1)
Denote Π as the optimal expected profit of the supplier. Note that the marginal cost c may incor-
porate both the manufacturing cost (such as material and labor) as well as the cost of building an
additional unit of manufacturing capacity. Depending on the application setting, the cost of build-
ing capacity can be more significant than the per-unit manufacturing cost. If there is no demand
information gained between the building of capacity and the production stage, then capacity is
built according to the planned production. Therefore, we can assume both these costs to be com-
bined in c. Furthermore, note that one can incorporate a salvage value, sa ≤ c to our model without
affecting our results. To keep the exposition simple, we assume that sa = 0.
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We consider the general case for which the supplier decides upon both the price (MSRP) and
the production quantities (i.e., the supplier is a price setter). An alternative case of interest is the
one for which the price is exogenously given (i.e., the supplier is a price taker and decides only
production quantity). As mentioned before, we consider the early stages of the EV market as a
good application of the monopolist price setting model. In contrast, the solar panel manufacturing
industry is highly competitive, as the top ten companies share less than half of the US market. As
a result, the solar manufacturing market is possibly better represented with a price taker model.
In this paper, we treat both settings, but focus on the more complex price setter model. Due to
space limitations, we relegate the price taker case to the Appendix.
We assume the government is introducing consumer subsidies, r, in order to stimulate sales to
reach a given adoption target. We denote by Γ the target adoption level, which is assumed to be
common knowledge. Conditional on achieving this target in expectation, the government wants
to minimize the total cost of the subsidy program. Define Exp as the minimal expected subsidy
expenditures, which is defined through the following optimization problem:
Exp= min
r
r ·E[min(q,D(z, ))]
s.t. E
[
min(q,D(z, ))
]≥ Γ (2)
r≥ 0
In what follows, we discuss the modeling choices for the government in more detail.
Government’s constraints The adoption level constraint used in (2) is motivated by real
policy-making practice. For example, President Obama stated the adoption target of 1 million of
electric vehicles by 2015 (see DOE 2011). More precisely, the government is interested in designing
consumer subsidies so as to achieve the predetermined adoption target. An additional possibility
is to incorporate a budget constraint for the government in addition to the adoption target. In
various practical settings, the government may consider both requirements (see for example CSI
2007). Incorporating a budget constraint in our setting does not actually affect the optimal subsidy
solution of the government problem (assuming the budget does not make the problem infeasible). In
addition, one can show that there exists a one-to-one correspondence between the target adoption
level and the minimum budget necessary to achieve this target. Hence, we will only solve the
problem with a target adoption constraint, but the problem could be reformulated as a budget
allocation problem with similar insights.
Given that actual sales are stochastic, the constraint used in our model meets the adoption
target in expectation:
E
[
min(q,D(z, ))
]≥ Γ. (3)
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Our results can be extended to the case where the government aims to achieve a target adoption
level with some desired probability (chance constraint) instead of an expected value constraint.
Such a modeling choice will be more suitable when the government is risk-averse and is given by:
P
([
min(q,D(z, ))
]≥ Γ)≥∆. (4)
∆ represents the level of conservatism of the government. For example, when ∆ = 0.99, the gov-
ernment is more conservative than when ∆ = 0.9. We note that the insights we gain are similar for
both classes of constraints (3) and (4) and therefore in the remainder of this paper, due to space
limitations, we focus on the case of an expected value constraint.
Note that one can consider a constraint on greenhouse gas reduction instead of an adoption
target. If the government has a desired target on emissions reduction, it can be translated to an
adoption target in EV sales, for example. In particular, one can compute the decrease in carbon
emissions between a gasoline car and an electric vehicle (see e.g., Arar (2010)). In other words, the
value of Γ is directly tied to a value of a carbon emissions reduction target. Therefore, considering
a constraint on carbon emissions, the results in this paper remain valid. More generally, if we set
a target on any increasing function of sales, the results also remain the same.
Government’s objective Two common objectives for the government are to minimize expen-
ditures or to maximize the welfare in the system. In the former, the government aims to minimize
only its own expected expenditures, given by:
Exp= r ·E[min(q,D(z, ))]. (5)
Welfare can be defined as the sum of the expected supplier’s profit (denoted by Π and defined in
(1)) and the consumer surplus (denoted by CS) net the expected government expenditures:
W = Π +CS−Exp. (6)
The consumer surplus is formally defined in Section 4.3 and aims to capture the consumer satisfac-
tion. Interestingly, one can show that under some mild assumptions, both objectives are equivalent
and yield the same optimal subsidy policy for the government. The result is summarized in the
following Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. Assume that the total welfare is a concave and unimodal function of the subsidy
r. Then, there exists a threshold value Γ∗ such that for any given value of the target level above
this threshold, i.e., Γ≥ Γ∗, both problems are equivalent.
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Proof. Since the welfare function is concave and unimodal, there exists a unique optimal uncon-
strained maximizer solution. If this unconstrained solution satisfies the adoption level target, the
constrained problem is solved to optimality. However, if the target adoption level Γ is large enough,
this solution is not feasible with respect to the adoption constraint. By using the non-decreasing
property of the expected sales with respect to r (see Lemma 2 in the Appendix), one can see
that the optimal solution of the constrained welfare maximization problem is obtained when the
adoption level constraint is exactly met. Otherwise, by considering a larger subsidy level, one still
satisfies the adoption constraint but does not increase the welfare. Consequently, both problems
are equivalent and yield the same optimal solution for which the adoption constraint is exactly
met. 
In conclusion, if the value of the target level Γ is sufficiently large, both problems (minimizing
expenditures in (5) and maximizing welfare in (6)) are equivalent. Note that the concavity and
unimodality assumptions are satisfied for various demand models including the linear demand
function. In particular, for linear demand, the threshold Γ∗ can be characterized in closed form
and is equal to twice the optimal production with zero subsidy and therefore satisfied in most
reasonable settings. Furthermore, for smaller adoption target levels, Cohen et al. (2013b) show
that even for multiple products in a competitive environment, the gaps between both settings
(minimizing expenditures versus maximizing welfare) are small (if not zero) so that both problems
yield solutions that are close to one another. For the remainder of the paper, we assume the
government objective is to minimize expenditures, while satisfying an expected adoption target,
as in (2). This modeling choice was further motivated by private communications with sponsors of
the MIT Energy Initiative.
Besides minimizing the subsidy cost, another objective for the government is often to maximize
the positive environmental externalities of the green technology product. Assume there is a positive
benefit, denoted by pCO2 , for each ton of CO2 emission avoided by each unit sold of the green
product. By introducing a monetary value to emissions, one can consider a combined government
objective of minimizing the subsidy program cost, minus the benefit of emission reduction, i.e.,
r ·E[min(q,D(z, ))]− pCO2 ·E[min(q,D(z, ))]. (7)
Similarly to Proposition 1, we can show that if there is an adoption target larger than a certain
threshold Γ¯, then the objectives in (5) and (7) are equivalent and yield the same outcomes. In
particular, if Γ ≥ Γ¯, the optimal subsidy policy will be defined by the tightness of the adoption
target constraint. Alternatively, if the subsidy level r¯ required to reach Γ is significantly larger than
the price of carbon, pCO2 , the optimal subsidy is defined by the target constraint. Given a certain
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adoption target level Γ, there is a threshold level p¯CO2 such that for any price of carbon below
this level, pCO2 ≤ p¯CO2 , the optimal subsidy policy is defined by the adoption target constraint. We
next show that for an EV such as the Chevy Volt, a conservative estimate for the price of carbon
emission mitigated for each EV sold is much lower than this threshold level.
As we mentioned, the positive externalities of EVs correspond to the reductions in CO2 emissions
throughout their lifetime, converted to US dollars. Following the analysis in Arar (2010), the
emission rate per unit of energy amounts to 755 [Kg CO2 × MWh−1]. By using the calculations
in Cohen et al. (2013b), an estimate for an EV gas emission reduction is about 50.3 [Ton CO2].
In order to convert this number to US dollars, we use the value assigned by the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to a Ton of CO2. The value for 2014 is 23.3 [$ × (Ton
CO2)
−1] so that the monetary positive externality of an EV is equal to $1,172. One can see that
the positive externality for an EV is smaller than the consumer subsidies (equal to $7,500). This
implies that it is sufficient to minimize expenditures, as described in (5).
With the formal definitions of the optimization problems faced by the supplier (1) and the
government (2), in the next section we analyze of the optimal decisions of each party and the
impact of demand uncertainty.
4. The Price Setter Model
For products such as electric vehicles, where there are only a few suppliers in the market, it is
reasonable to assume that the selling price (MSRP) of the product is endogenous. In other words,
p is a decision variable chosen by the supplier in addition to the production quantity q. In this
case, the supplier’s optimization problem can be viewed as a price setting newsvendor problem
(see e.g., Petruzzi and Dada (1999)). Note though that in our problem the solution also depends
on the government subsidy. In particular, both q and p are decision variables that should be
optimally chosen by the supplier for each value of the subsidy r set by the government. To keep
the analysis simple and to be consistent with the literature, we consider separately the cases of a
stochastic demand with additive or multiplicative uncertainty. In each case, we first consider general
demand functions and then specialize to linear and iso-elastic demand models that are common
in the literature. Finally, we compare our results to the case where demand is approximated by a
deterministic average value and draw conclusions about the cost of ignoring demand uncertainty.
In practice, companies very often ignore demand uncertainty and consider average values when
taking decisions such as price and production quantities. As a result, we are interested in under-
standing how the optimal subsidy levels, prices and production quantities are affected when we
explicitly consider demand uncertainty relative to the case when demand is just approximated by
its deterministic average value. For example, the comparison may be useful to quantify the value
of investing some large efforts in developing better demand forecasts.
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We next present the analysis for both additive and multiplicative demand uncertainty.
4.1. Additive Noise
Define additive demand uncertainty as follows:
D(z, ) = y(z) + . (8)
Here, y(z) = E
[
D(z, )
]
is a function of the effective price z = p− r and represents the nominal
deterministic part of demand and  is a random variable with cumulative distribution function
(CDF) F.
Assumption 1. We impose the following conditions on demand:
• Demand depends only on the difference between p and r denoted by z.
• The deterministic part of the demand function y(z) is positive, twice differentiable and a
decreasing function of z and hence invertible.
• When p= c and r= 0 the target level cannot be achieved, i.e., y(c)< Γ.
• The noise  is a random variable with zero mean: E[] = 0.
We consider that the demand function represents the aggregate demand for all the consumers
in the market during the entire horizon. As a result, the assumption that the target level cannot
be achieved if the product is sold at cost and there are no subsidies translates to the fact that the
total number of consumers will not reach the desired adoption target level without government
subsidies. Under Assumption 1, we characterize the solution of problems (1) and (2) sequentially.
First, we solve the optimal quantity q∗(p, r) and price p∗(r) offered by the supplier as a function
of the subsidy r. By substituting the optimal solutions of the supplier problem, we can solve the
government problem defined in (2). Note that problem (2) is not necessarily convex, even for very
simple instances, because the government needs to account for the supplier’s best response p∗(r) and
q∗(p, r). Nevertheless, one can still solve this using the tightness of the target adoption constraint.
Because of the non-convexity of the problem, the tightness of the constraint cannot be trivially
assumed. We formally prove the constraint is tight at optimality in Theorem 1. Using this result,
we obtain the optimal subsidy of the stochastic problem (2), denoted by rsto. The resulting optimal
decisions of price and quantity are denoted by psto = p
∗(rsto) and qsto = q∗(psto, rsto). From problems
(1) and (2), the optimal profit of the supplier is denoted by Πsto and government expenditures by
Expsto.
We consider problems (1) and (2), where demand is equal to its expected value, that is:
E
[
D(z, )
]
= y(z). We denote this deterministic case with the subscript “det”, with optimal values:
rdet, pdet, qdet, zdet,Πdet,Expdet. We next compare these metrics in the deterministic versus stochastic
case.
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Theorem 1. Assume that the following condition is satisfied:
2y′(z) + (p− c) · y′′(z) + c
2
p3
· 1
f
(
F−1
(
p−c
p
)) < 0. (9)
The following holds:
1. The optimal price of problem (1) as a function of r is the solution of the following non-linear
equation:
y(p− r) +E[min(F−1 (p− cp ), )]+ y′(p− r) · (p− c) = 0. (10)
In addition, using the solution from (10), one can compute the optimal production quantity:
q∗(p, r) = y(p− r) +F−1
(p− c
p
)
. (11)
2. The optimal solution of the government problem is obtained when the target adoption level is
exactly met.
3. The optimal expressions follow the following relations:
zsto = y
−1(Γ−K(psto)) ≤ zdet = y−1(Γ)
qsto = Γ +F
−1

(psto− c
psto
)
−K(psto) ≥ qdet = Γ,
where K(psto) is defined as:
K(psto) =E
[
min(F−1
(psto− c
psto
)
, )
]
. (12)
If, in addition, the function y(z) is convex:
psto = c+
Γ
|y′(zsto)| ≤ pdet = c+
Γ
|y′(zdet)|
Πsto =
Γ2
|y′(zsto)| − c · (qsto−Γ) ≤ Πdet =
Γ2
|y′(zdet)|
Remark 1. Note that for a general function y(p−r), one cannot derive a closed form solution of
(10) for p∗(r). Consequently, one cannot find a closed form expression for the optimal price psto for
a general additive demand. This is consistent with the fact that there does not exist a closed form
solution for the price-setting newsvendor. However, one can use (10) to characterize the optimal
solution and even numerically compute the optimal price by using a binary search method (see
more details in the Appendix).
Similarly, one cannot generally express K(psto) in closed form. Instead, K(psto) represents a
measure of the magnitude of the noise that depends on the price psto and the noise distribution.
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K(psto) is mainly used to draw insights on the impact of demand uncertainty on the optimal
decision variables.
Assumption (9) guarantees the uniqueness of the optimal price as a function of the subsidies,
as it implies the strict concavity of the profit function with respect to p. In case this condition
does not hold, problem (1) is still numerically tractable (see Petruzzi and Dada 1999). For the
remainder of this paper, we will assume condition (9) is satisfied. For the case of linear demand
we can use relation (15) instead, which is a sufficient condition for (9) that is satisfied in many
reasonable settings.
Note that the optimal ordering quantity in (11) is expressed as the expected demand plus the
optimal newsvendor quantile (p− c)/p related to the demand uncertainty. The government can
ensure that the expected sales achieve the desired target adoption level Γ by controlling the effective
price z. When demand is stochastic, in order to achieve an expected sales of Γ, the government
must encourage the supplier to produce a higher quantity than Γ to compensate for the demand
scenarios where stock-outs occur. The additional production level is captured by K(psto).
The optimal price p is characterized by the optimality condition written in (10) that depends
on the cost and on the price elasticity evaluated at that optimal price p, denoted by Ed(p). This
can be rewritten so that the marginal cost equals the marginal revenue, i.e., c= p
(
1− 1/Ed(p)
)
.
Even without knowing a closed form expression for the optimal price, we can still show that the
optimal price decreases in the presence of demand uncertainty and so does the firm profit.
Remark 2. The results of Theorem 1 can be generalized to describe how the optimal variables
(i.e., z, q, p and Π) change as demand uncertainty increases. Instead of comparing the stochastic
case to the deterministic case (i.e., where there is no demand uncertainty), one can instead consider
how the optimal variables vary in terms of the magnitude of the noise (for more details, see the
proof of Theorems 1 and 5 in the Appendix). In particular, the quantity that captures the effect
of demand uncertainty is K(psto).
Since the noise  has zero-mean, the quantity K(psto) in (12) is always non-positive. In addition,
when there is no noise (i.e., = 0 with probability 1), K(psto) = 0 and the deterministic scenario
is obtained as a special case. For any intermediate case, K(psto) is negative and non-increasing
with respect to the magnitude of the noise. For example, if the noise  is uniformly distributed, the
inverse CDF function can be written as a linear function of the standard deviation σ as follows:
F−1
(p− c
p
)
= σ
√
3 ·
(
2 · p− c
p
− 1
)
. (13)
Therefore, K(psto) scales monotonically with the standard deviation for uniform demand uncer-
tainty. In other words, all the comparisons of the optimal variables (e.g., effective price, production
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quantities etc) are monotonic functions of the standard deviation of the noise. For other distribu-
tions, the relationship with the standard deviation is not as simple but the key quantity is K(psto).
As a result, one can extend our insights in a continuous fashion with respect to the magnitude of
the noise. For example, the inequality of the effective price is given by: zsto = y
−1
(
Γ−K(psto)
)
.
This equation is non-increasing with respect to the magnitude of K(psto) and is maximized when
there is no noise (deterministic demand) so that zdet = zsto = y
−1(Γ). In general, as the magnitude
of the noise increases, the gaps between the optimal decision variables increase (see plots of optimal
decisions as functions of the standard deviation of demand uncertainty in Figure 4 of Section 7).
Remark 3. The solution of the optimal quantity q and the effective price z provide another
interesting insight. Theorem 1 states that when demand is uncertain, the consumers are better
off in terms of effective price and production quantities (this is true for any decreasing demand
function). Furthermore, the selling price and the profit of the supplier are lower in the presence of
uncertainty, assuming demand is convex. These results imply the consumers are in general better
off when demand is uncertain. Nevertheless, as we will show in Section 4.3, this is not always the
case when we use the aggregate consumer surplus as a metric.
In various settings, the selling price p is exogenously given (i.e., price taker model). This setting
is relevant for products where the market is fairly saturated with suppliers. We present the results
for the price taker model in the Appendix. We observe that for the price setter model, the results
depend on the structure of the demand function unlike in the price taker case, where the results
of Theorem 5 (see Appendix) are robust with respect to the type of demand.
By focusing on a few demand functions, we can provide additional insights. We will first consider
the linear demand case, which is the most common in the literature. The simplicity of this demand
form enables us to derive closed-form solutions and a deeper analysis of the impact of demand
uncertainty. Note that the insights can be quite different for non-linear demand functions. The
results presented in Theorem 1 justify the need for considering non-linear functions as well. For
this reason, we later consider the iso-elastic demand case and compare it to the linear case.
The impact of demand uncertainty on the subsidy level r and the overall government expenditure
is harder to observe for a general demand form. In order to explore this further, we focus on the
cases of linear and iso-elastic demands. For both cases, we show that the subsidy increases with
the added inventory risk captured by K(psto).
Linear Demand In what follows, we quantify the effect of demand uncertainty on the subsidy
level and the expected government expenditures. We can obtain such results for specific demand
models, among them the linear demand model. Define the linear demand function as:
D(z, ) = d¯−α · z+ , (14)
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where d¯ and α are given positive parameters that represent the maximal market share and the
price elasticity respectively. Note that for this model, a sufficient condition for assumption (9) to
hold is given by:
α>
1
2c · inf
x
f(x)
.
For example, if the additive noise is uniformly distributed, i.e., ∼ U [−a2, a2]; a2 > 0, (note that
since the noise is uniform with zero mean, it has to be symmetric) we obtain:
α>
a2
c
. (15)
One can see that by fixing the cost c, condition in (15) is satisfied if the price elasticity α is large
relative to the standard deviation of the noise. Next, we derive closed form expressions for the
optimal price, production quantities, subsidies, profit and expenditures for both deterministic and
stochastic demand models and compare the two settings.
Theorem 2. The closed form expressions and comparisons for the linear demand model in (14)
are given by:
psto = c+
Γ
α
= pdet
qsto = Γ +F
−1

(psto− c
psto
)
−K(psto) ≥ qdet = Γ
rsto =
2Γ
α
+ c− d¯
α
− 1
α
·K(psto) ≥ rdet = 2Γ
α
+ c− d¯
α
Πsto =
Γ2
α
− c · (qsto−Γ) ≤ Πdet = Γ
2
α
Expsto = Γ · rsto ≥ Expdet = Γ · rdet
We note that the results of Theorem 2 can be presented in a more general continuous fashion as
explained in Remark 2. Surprisingly, the optimal price is the same for both the deterministic and
stochastic models. In other words, the optimal selling price is not affected by demand uncertainty
for linear demand. On the other hand, with increased quantities, the expected profit of the supplier
is lower under demand uncertainty. At the same time, the optimal subsidy level and expenditures
increase with uncertainty. Therefore, both supplier and government are worse off when demand is
uncertain. Corollary 1 and the following discussion provide further intuition in how this cost of
demand uncertainty is shared between the supplier and the government.
Corollary 1.
1. qsto− qdet decreases in c and increases in Γ.
2. rsto− rdet increases in c and decreases in Γ.
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3. Assume that  has support [a1, a2]. Then, the optimal subsidy for the stochastic and determin-
istic demands relate as follows:
rdet ≤ rsto ≤ rdet + |a1|
α
.
Corollary 1 can be better understood in terms of the optimal service level for stochastic demand,
denoted by ρ= psto−c
psto
. Note that ρ is an endogenous decision of the supplier, which is a function of
the optimal price psto. For linear demand, the optimal service level can be simplified as: ρ=
Γ
cα+Γ
.
This service level is decreasing in the cost c but increasing with respect to the target adoption Γ.
On one hand, when the optimal price is significantly higher than the production cost, i.e., psto
c, the high profit margin encourages the supplier to satisfy a larger share of demand by increasing
its production. As psto increases, the service level ρ increases and in the limit, when psto→∞, the
service level goes to 1 and the supplier has incentives to overproduce and bear all the inventory
risk. Note that the limiting case where psto→∞ is only used for illustration purposes and in order
to draw additional insights. One can easily replace this condition by the case where psto is large
enough (i.e., significantly larger than the cost). In this case, the government may set low subsidies,
in fact the same as in the deterministic case, which guarantee that the average demand meets the
target. On the other hand, when psto is close to c (low profit margin), or equivalently in the limit
when ρ→ 0, the supplier has no incentives to bear any risk and produces quantities to match the
lowest possible demand realization. In this case, the government will bear all the inventory risk by
increasing the value of the subsidies. By assuming the worst case realization of demand uncertainty
when deciding the subsidy, the government also induces a production level that meets the target
without risk for the supplier. In conclusion, there is an interesting risk sharing insight that depends
on the profit margin of the product.
Note that as production cost c increases, the required subsidy is larger for both stochastic and
deterministic demands, meaning the average subsidy expenditure is higher. At the same time, the
service level ρ decreases and, from Corollary 1, the gap between rsto and rdet increases. This can
be viewed as an increase in the cost of demand uncertainty for the government.
A similar reasoning can be applied to the target adoption level. As Γ increases, the overall cost
of the subsidy program increases, as expected. Interestingly, the service level ρ also increases. From
Corollary 1, the gap between qsto and qdet widens, meaning the supplier with stochastic demand is
building more inventory. At the same time, the gap between rsto and rdet shrinks. Effectively, the
burden of demand uncertainty is transferred from the government to the supplier as Γ increases. An
interpretation can be that a higher target adoption will induce the product to be more profitable as
it needs larger subsidies to generate enough supply and demand. This will make the supplier take
on more of the inventory risk and consequently switching who bears the cost of demand uncertainty.
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Corollary 1.3 shows that the government subsidy decision is bounded by the worst case demand
realization normalized by the price sensitivity. In other words, it provides a guarantee on the gap
between the subsidies for stochastic and deterministic demands.
In conclusion, by studying the special case of a linear demand model, we obtain the following
additional insights: (i) The optimal price does not depend on demand uncertainty. (ii) The optimal
subsidy set by the government increases with demand uncertainty. Consequently, the introduction
of demand uncertainty decreases the effective price paid by consumers. In addition, the government
will spend more when demand is uncertain. (iii) The cost of demand uncertainty is shared by
the government and the supplier and depends on the profit margin (equivalently, service level) of
the product. As expected, lower/higher margins mean the supplier takes less/more inventory risk.
Therefore, increasing the adoption target or decreasing the manufacturing cost will shift the cost
of demand uncertainty from the government to the supplier.
4.2. Multiplicative Noise
In this section, we consider a demand with a multiplicative noise (see for example, Granot and Yin
(2008)). The nominal deterministic part is assumed to be a function of the effective price, denoted
by y(z):
D(z, ) = y(z) ·  (16)
Assumption 2. • Demand depends only on the difference between p and r denoted by z.
• The deterministic part of the demand function y(z) is positive, twice differentiable and a
decreasing function of z and hence invertible.
• When p= c and r= 0 the target level cannot be achieved, i.e., y(c)< Γ.
• The noise  is a positive and finite random variable with mean equal to one: E[] = 1.
One can show that the results of Theorem 1 hold for both additive and multiplicative demand
models. The proof for multiplicative noise follows a similar methodology and is not repeated due
to space limitations. We next consider the iso-elastic demand case to derive additional insights on
the optimal subsidy.
Iso-elastic demand models are very popular in various application areas. In particular, a large
number of references in economics consider such models (see, e.g., Simon and Blume (1994) and
Pindyck and Rubinfeld (2001)) as well as revenue management (see Talluri and Van Ryzin (2006)).
Iso-elastic demand is also sometimes called the log-log model and the main property is that elas-
ticities are constant for any given combination of price and quantities. In addition, it does not
assume a finite upper limit on price. For more details, see for example Huang et al. (2013). Various
papers in oligopoly competition consider iso-elastic demand (see, e.g., Lau and Lau (2003), Beard
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(2013) and Puu (1991)). In Puu (1991), the authors study the dynamics of two competing firms
in a market in terms of Cournot’s duopoly theory. In Lau and Lau (2003), the authors consider
(among others) an iso-elastic demand in a multi-echelon inventory/pricing setting and show that
the results might differ depending on the demand shape. Another application that uses iso-elastic
demands relates to commodity pricing (see, e.g., Deaton and Laroque (1992)). Finally, practition-
ers and researchers have used iso-elastic demand models for products in retail such as groceries,
fashion (see, e.g., Pindyck and Rubinfeld (2001), Capps (1989) and Andreyeva et al. (2010)) and
gasoline (e.g., Bentzen (1994)).
Iso-Elastic Demand Define the iso-elastic demand as:
y(z) = d¯ · z−α (α> 1). (17)
The iso-elastic model considered in the literature usually assumes that α> 1 in order to satisfy
the Increasing Price Elasticity (IPE) property (see, e.g., Yao et al. (2006)). Note that the function
y(z) is convex with respect to z for any value α> 1. Therefore, the results from Theorem 1 hold.
Using this particular demand structure, we obtain the following additional results on the optimal
subsidy.
Proposition 2. For the iso-elastic demand model in (17), we have:
rsto ≥ rdet.
We note that the result of Proposition 2 can be presented in a continuous fashion, as explained
in Remark 2. Note also that this allows us to recover the same results as the linear additive demand
model regarding the impact of demand uncertainty on the subsidies. These two cases show that
the subsidy increases with demand uncertainty.
4.3. Consumer Surplus
In this section, we study the effect of demand uncertainty on consumers using consumer surplus as
a metric. For that purpose, we compare the aggregate level of consumer surplus under stochastic
and deterministic demand models. The consumer surplus is an economic measure of consumer
satisfaction calculated by analyzing the difference between what consumers are willing to pay and
the market price. For a general deterministic price demand curve, the consumer surplus is denoted
by CSdet and can be computed as the area under the demand curve above the market price (see,
e.g., Vives (2001)):
CSdet =
∫ qdet
0
(
D−1(q)− zdet
)
dq=
∫ zmax
zdet
D(z)dz. (18)
Cohen, Lobel and Perakis: Consumer Subsidies with Industry Response for Green Technology Adoption
22
We note that in our case, the market price is equal to the effective price paid by consumers
z = p − r. Denote, D−1(q) as the effective price that will generate demand exactly equal to q.
For an illustration, see Figure 2. Note that zdet and qdet represent the optimal effective price and
production, whereas zmax corresponds to the value of the effective price that yields zero demand.
The consumer surplus represents the surplus induced by consumers that are willing to pay more
than the posted price.
Figure 2 Consumer surplus for deterministic demand
When demand is uncertain however, defining the consumer surplus (denoted by CSsto) is some-
what more subtle due to the possibility of a stock-out. Several papers on peak load pricing and
capacity investments by a power utility under stochastic demand address partially this model-
ing issue (see Carlton (1986), Crew et al. (1995) and Brown and Johnson (1969)). Nevertheless,
the models developed in this literature are not applicable to the price setting newsvendor. More
specifically, in Brown and Johnson (1969) the authors assume that the utility power facility has
access to the willingness to pay of the customers so that it can decline the ones with the lowest
valuations. This assumption is not justifiable in our setting where a “first-come-first-serve” logic
with random arrivals is more suitable. In Ovchinnikov and Raz (2013), the authors study a price
setting newsvendor model for public goods and consider the consumer surplus for linear additive
stochastic demand.
For general stochastic demand functions, the consumer surplus CSsto() is defined for each
realization of demand uncertainty . If there was no supply constraint, considering the effective
price and the realized demand, the total amount of potential consumer surplus is defined as:∫ zmax()
zsto
D(z, )dz.
Since customers are assumed to arrive in a first-come-first-serve manner, irrespective of their
willingness to pay, under certain demand realizations, some proportion of these customers will
not be served due to stock-outs. The proportion of served customers under one of these demand
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realizations is given by the ratio of actual sales over potential demand: min(D(zsto,),qsto)
D(zsto,)
. Therefore,
the consumer surplus can be defined as the total available surplus times the proportion of that
surplus that is actually served.
CSsto() =
∫ zmax()
zsto
D(z, )dz · min
(
D(zsto, ), qsto
)
D(zsto, )
. (19)
We note that in this case, the consumer surplus is a random variable that depends on the demand
through the noise . Note that we are interested in comparing CSdet to the expected consumer
surplus E[CSsto()]. For stochastic demand, (19) has a similar interpretation as its deterministic
counterpart. Nevertheless, we also incorporate the possibility that a consumer who wants to buy the
product does not find it available. As we will show, the effect of demand uncertainty on consumer
surplus depends on the structure of the nominal demand function. In particular, we provide the
results for the two special cases we have considered in the previous section and show that the effect
is opposite. For the linear demand function in (14), we have:
CSdet =
∫ qdet
0
(
D−1(q)− zdet
)
dq=
q2det
2α
=
Γ2
2α
. (20)
For iso-elastic demand from (17), we obtain:
CSdet =
∫ qdet
0
(
D−1(q)− zdet
)
dq=
d¯
α− 1 ·
( d¯
Γ
) 1−α
α
(α> 1). (21)
One can then show the following results regarding the effect of demand uncertainty on the consumer
surplus for these two demand functions.
Proposition 3. For the linear demand model in (14), we have:
E[CSsto]≥CSdet. (22)
For the iso-elastic demand model in (17) with α> 1, we have:
E[CSsto]≤CSdet. (23)
Proposition 3 shows that under linear demand, the expected consumer surplus is larger when
considering demand uncertainty, whereas it is lower for the iso-elastic model. We already have
shown in Theorem 1 that the effective price is lower and that the production quantities are larger
when considering demand uncertainty relative to the deterministic model. This result holds for both
linear and iso-elastic demand models. Therefore, one could expect consumer surplus to increase
with uncertainty, as consumers benefit both in price and quantity. However, consumer surplus
actually decreases for the iso-elastic case.
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On one hand, demand uncertainty benefits the consumers since it lowers the effective price and
increase the quantities. On the other hand, demand uncertainty introduces a stock-out probability
because some of the consumers may not be able to find the product available. These two factors
(effective price and stock-out probability) affect the consumer surplus in opposite ways. For iso-
elastic demand, the second factor is dominant and therefore the consumer surplus is lower when
demand is uncertain. In particular, the iso-elastic demand admits some consumers that are willing
to pay a very large price. If these consumers experience a stock-out, it will reduce drastically the
aggregate consumer surplus. For linear demand, the dominant factor is not the stock-out probability
and consequently, the consumer surplus is larger when demand is uncertain. We note that this
result is related to the structure of the nominal demand rather than the noise effect. For example,
if we were to consider a linear demand with a multiplicative noise, we will have the same result as
for the linear demand with additive noise.
The consumer surplus result in Proposition 3 is perhaps one of the most counter-intuitive finding
of this paper. On one hand, for linear demand, the consumer surplus increases under stochastic
demand. This raises the expenditures for the government and lowers the profit for the supplier,
which translates into higher surplus for the consumers in expectation. The underlying reason for
this higher average surplus relies on the fact that the negative effect of stock-outs on consumers is
dominated by the lower effective price. On the other hand, for the iso-elastic case, since there is no
price discrimination, the stock-outs on consumers with high valuations outweigh the benefits of the
lower effective price paid by consumers. In fact, the gap between the stochastic and deterministic
consumer surplus widens when K(psto) is smaller (recall that in the case of a multiplicative noise,
0≤K(psto)≤ 1). This happens when the profit margin is low, meaning there is more inventory risk
for the supplier.
At first glance one can naively infer that demand uncertainty always benefits consumers, but
that is not always the case. In general, the uncertainty impact on consumer surplus will depend
on the trade-off between lower prices and the possibility of under-serving customers with high
valuations.
Next, we compare and contrast our findings on production quantity, price and profit as well as
consumer surplus against what is already known in the literature about the classical price setting
newsvendor problem. This way, we can investigate the impact of incorporating the government as
an additional player in the system. In the classical price setting newsvendor, there does not exist a
closed form expression for the optimal price and production even for simple demand forms. However,
one can still compare the outcomes between stochastic and deterministic scenarios. We compare the
results of Theorems 1 and 2 to the classical price setting newsvendor (i.e., without the government).
The optimal price, quantity and profit can be found in a similar way as in this paper. First, one
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can show that the optimal price follows the same relation as in our paper, i.e., psto ≤ pdet. Note
that in the classical model, p is equivalent to the effective price paid by consumers and therefore,
similar insights apply (see Theorem 1). However, the relation for the optimal quantity differs. More
precisely, the inequality on quantity depends on the critical newsvendor quantile being larger or
smaller than 1. For symmetric additive noises, if the profit margin is below 0.5 (this is usually the
case for the EV industry), the supplier will not take the over stock risk and the optimal quantity
decreases with respect to the magnitude of the noise. As a result, the optimal quantity relation will
be opposite than the one we obtain in this paper, where the government is an additional player
in the supply chain. In addition, the results on optimal profits agree with the case of the paper
(again, assuming the profit margin is below 0.5) so that the expected profits for stochastic demand
are lower relative to the case where demand is deterministic, as expected. In conclusion, the effect
of demand uncertainty for the classical price setting newsvendor (assuming the profit margin is
below 0.5) states that quantity, price and profit are all lower when demand is stochastic. When
comparing to Theorem 1, we first observe that the results do not depend on the profit margin. In
addition, the optimal quantity follows the opposite relation, whereas the price and profit follow the
same one. Therefore, in our setting, the government is bearing some uncertainty risk together with
the supplier and incentivizes the supplier to over produce in order to make sure that the adoption
target is achieved on expectation. Finally, one can do a similar analysis for the expected consumer
surplus. However, the analysis is not straightforward and depends on the demand function, the
structure of the noise (additive or multiplicative) and the capacity rationing rule (see Cohen et al.
(2013a)). In the price taker setting, when demand is assumed to be linear with an additive noise,
one can show that the expected consumer surplus is smaller when demand stochastic, unlike our
case in the paper (for linear demand, see equation (22)). Indeed, when the government is present
in the supply chain, he/she can help increasing the production and consequently, inducing larger
consumer surplus in expectation. Note that the profit is still lower, as the stochastic scenario
remains more risky for the supplier.
5. Supply-chain Coordination
In this section, we examine how the results change in the case where the system is centrally man-
aged. In this case, one can imagine that the government and the supplier take coordinated decisions
together. The central planner needs to decide the price, the subsidy and the production quantities
simultaneously. This situation may arise when the firm is owned by the government. We study
the centrally managed problem as a benchmark to compare to the decentralized case developed in
the previous sections. In particular, we are interested in understanding if the decentralization will
have an adverse impact on either party and more importantly if it will hurt the consumers. We
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show in this section that this is not the case. In fact, the decentralized problem achieves the same
outcome as the centralized problem and hence, government subsidies act as a coordinating mech-
anism as far as consumer are concerned. Supply chain coordination has been extensively studied
in the literature. In particular, some of the supply-chain contracting literature (see, e.g., Cachon
(2003)) discusses mechanisms that can be used to coordinate operational decisions such as price
and production quantities.
Define the central planner’s combined optimization problem to maximize the firm’s profits minus
government expenditures as follows:
max
q,z
z ·E[min(q,D(z, ))]− c · q (24)
s.t. E
[
min(q,D(z, ))
]≥ Γ
Note that in this case, we impose the additional constraint p ≥ c so that the selling price has
to be at least larger than the cost. Indeed, for the centralized version, it is not clear that this
constraint is automatically satisfied by the optimal solution as it was in the decentralized setting.
Our goal is to show how the centralized solutions for q, p and r compare to their decentralized
counterparts from Section 4. We consider both deterministic and stochastic demand models and
focus on additive uncertainty under Assumption 1.
Theorem 3. The optimal effective price z = p− r and production level q are the same in both
the decentralized and centralized models. Therefore, consumer subsidies are a sufficient mechanism
to coordinate the government and the supplier.
Note that for problem (24), one can only solve for the effective price and not p and r separately.
In particular, there are multiple optimal solutions for the centralized case and the decentralized
solution happens to be one them. If the government and the supplier collude into a single entity,
this does not affect the consumers in terms of effective price and production quantities. Therefore,
the consumers are not affected by the coordination. This result might be surprising as one could
think that the coordination will add additional information and power to the central planner as well
as mitigate some of the competition effects between the supplier and the government. However, in
the original decentralized problem, the government acts as a quantity coordinator in the sense that
the optimal solutions in both cases are obtained by the tightness of the target adoption constraint.
6. Subsidizing the manufacturer’s cost
In this section, we consider a different incentive mechanism where the government offers subsidies
directly to the manufacturer (as opposed to the end consumers). In particular, our goals are (i) to
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study if the impact of demand uncertainty and most of our insights are preserved if the government
were to use a cost subsidy mechanism and (ii) to compare the outcomes of both mechanisms.
Offering subsidies directly to the manufacturer can be implemented by partially sharing the cost
of production or in form of loans or free capital to the supplier. Below, we formalize the model
for this setting and provide the results. We then summarize our findings as well as compare both
settings.
The government still seeks to encourage green technology adoption. Instead of offering rebates
to the end consumers, the government provides a subsidy, denoted by s≥ 0, directly to the man-
ufacturer. Note that this mechanism does not have a direct impact on the demand function that
depends only on the selling price p and not explicitly on s. As before, the government leads the
game by solving the following optimization problem:
min
s
s · q(p, s)
s.t. E
[
min(q,D(p, ))
]≥ Γ (25)
s≥ 0
Note that in this case, the government subsidizes the total produced units instead of the total
expected sold units as before.
Given a subsidy level s announced by the government, the supplier faces the following profit
maximization problem. Note that c denotes the cost of building an additional unit of manufacturing
capacity, as before.
Π = max
q,p
p ·E[min(q,D(p, ))]− (c− s) · q (26)
For simplicity, we assume a linear and additive demand but one can extend the results for
non-linear demand models as well as for multiplicative uncertainty. However, to keep the analysis
simple, we present the results for the linear case, given by:
D(p, ) = d¯−α · p+ , (27)
First, we study the impact of demand uncertainty on the decision variables for the cost subsidy
mechanism (denoted by CSM). Second, we compare the outcomes for both mechanisms and elab-
orate on the differences. The results on the impact of demand uncertainty are summarized in the
following Theorem.
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Theorem 4. Assume a linear demand as in (27). The comparisons for the cost subsidy mech-
anism are given by:
psto =
d¯−Γ
α
+
1
α
·K ′ ≤ pdet =
d¯−Γ
α
qsto = Γ +F
−1

(psto− c+ ssto
psto
)
−K ′ ≥ qdet = Γ
ssto =
2Γ
α
+ c− d¯
α
− 1
α
·K ′ ≥ sdet =
2Γ
α
+ c− d¯
α
Πsto =
Γ2
α
− (c− ssto) · (qsto−Γ) ≤ Πdet = Γ
2
α
Expsto = qsto · ssto ≥ Expdet = Γ · sdet
Where, K ′ = E
[
min(F−1
(
psto−c+ssto
psto
)
, )
]
. Note that ssto is not given in a closed form expression
as both sides depend on ssto and one needs to solve a non-linear fixed point equation. The proof
of Theorem 4 is not reported due to space limitations (it is based on a similar methodology as
Theorem 2). One can see that the impact of demand uncertainty on all the decision variables is the
same as in the consumer rebates mechanism (see Theorem 2). Next, we compare the outcomes of
both mechanisms under deterministic and stochastic demands. The results are summarized below:
• The amount of subsidy (per unit) paid by the government follows:
ssto ≤ rsto; sdet = rdet.
• The price paid by the consumers follows:
pCSMsto ≥ psto− rsto; pCSMdet = pdet− rdet.
• The production quantities follows:
qCSMsto ≥ qsto; qCSMdet = qdet.
Note that for the cost subsidy mechanism the price paid by consumers is equal to p (since there
is no subsidy to consumers), whereas for the consumer subsidy mechanism, it is captured by p− r.
We observe that the government can save money on the per unit subsidy but it does not mean
that the overall expenditures are lower as more units are potentially subsidized. In addition, the
consumers are paying a larger price to compensate this government saving per unit. As a result, the
consumers are worse off in terms of price but better off in terms of available quantities. In addition,
when the demand is deterministic, all the outcomes are the same for both mechanisms. However,
in a stochastic setting, the type of mechanisms plays a key role in the risk sharing between the
supplier and the government induced by the demand uncertainty.
Cohen, Lobel and Perakis: Consumer Subsidies with Industry Response for Green Technology Adoption
29
Evaluating the cost subsidy mechanism impact on the profit of the supplier and the government
expenditures is hard to do analytically, since there is no closed-form expression for the optimal
subsidy level. Instead, we analyze the difference with the consumer subsidy model computation-
ally. Using different model parameters for this comparison, we consistently obtain the following
results. As the variance of the uncertainty increases, the expected government expenditures and
the expected profit of the supplier under the subsidy mechanism are higher when comparing to
the consumer subsidy mechanism. Consequently, although the optimal cost subsidy (per unit) is
lower, the overall program is actually more costly for the government. Indeed, the government is
subsidizing all the produced units instead of the sold ones and therefore is bearing some of the
overstock risk from the demand uncertainty. Since, the supplier is sharing this overstock risk with
the government, he can achieve higher profits on expectation despite the fact that the subsidy is
smaller by charging a higher price to the consumers.
7. Computational Results
In this section, we present some numerical examples that provide further insights into the results
derived in Section 4. The data used in these experiments is inspired by the sales data of the first
eighteen months of General Motors’ Chevy Volt (between December 2010 and June 2012). The total
aggregate sales was roughly equal to 3,500 electric vehicles, the listed price (MSRP) was $40,280
and the government subsidies was set to $7,500. In addition, we assume a 10% profit margin so
that the per-unit cost of building manufacturing capacity is $36,000. For simplicity, we present
here the results using a linear demand with an additive Gaussian noise. We observe that our results
along with the analysis are robust with respect to the distribution of demand uncertainty. In fact,
we obtain in our computational experiments the same insights for several demand distributions
(including non-symmetric ones). As discussed in Section 3, the government can either minimize
expenditures or maximize the total welfare. In particular, the two objectives are equivalent and
give rise to the same optimal subsidy policies for any target level Γ above a certain threshold. In
this case, this threshold is equal to 860 and the condition is therefore easily satisfied.
Throughout these experiments, we compute the optimal decisions for both the deterministic
and the stochastic demand models by using the optimal expressions derived in Section 4.1. We
first consider a fixed relatively large standard deviation σ = 4,200 (when demand is close to the
sales, this is equivalent to a coefficient of variation of 1.2) and plot the optimal subsidy, production
level, supplier’s profit and government expenditures as a function of the target level Γ for both
the deterministic and stochastic models. The plots are reported in Figure 3. We have derived in
Section 4.1 a set of inequalities regarding the relations of the optimal variables for deterministic
and stochastic demand models. The plots allow us to quantify the magnitude of these differences
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Figure 3 Optimal values as a function of the target level
and study the impact of demand uncertainty on the optimal policies. One can see from Figure 3
that the optimal production levels are not strongly affected by demand uncertainty (even for large
values of σ) when the target level Γ is set close to the expected sales value of 3,500. However, the
optimal value of the subsidy is almost multiplied by a factor of 2 when demand uncertainty is taken
into account. In other words, when the government and the supplier consider a richer environment
that accounts for demand uncertainty, the optimal subsidy nearly doubles.
One can see that the optimal production quantities for deterministic and stochastic cases differ
very little, while the subsidy and profit show significantly higher discrepancy. By looking at the
closed form expressions for linear demand in Theorem 1, one can see that the difference in optimal
quantity is equal to F−1
(
psto−c
psto
)
−K(psto), whereas the difference in optimal subsidy is proportional
to K(psto). Note that in our case, the profit margin is relatively small (order of 0.1) and therefore the
quantile value, F−1
(
psto−c
psto
)
, is likely to be negative. In particular, in our example, c= 36,000 and Γ
ranges from 1,500 to 10,000 so that the profit margin ranges from 0.05 to 0.25. As a result, since we
assume a symmetric noise distribution, the quantile is always negative. Consequently, the difference
in quantities is clearly smaller than the difference in subsidy. One interesting interpretation relies
on the fact that the cost of uncertainty in production quantity is shared between the supplier and
the government. Indeed, the government wants to incentivize the supplier to increase production in
order to reach the adoption target, and therefore is willing to share some of the uncertainty risk so
that qsto is not far from qdet. Finally, the profit discrepancy is larger than the quantity discrepancy
as it is equal to the same difference scaled by the cost c (see Theorem 1). In our example, c= 36,000
and therefore, we can see a more significant difference.
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This raises the following interesting question. What happens if the government ignores demand
uncertainty and decides to under-subsidize by using the optimal value from the deterministic
model? It is clear that in this case, since the real demand is uncertain, the expected sales will
not attain the desired expected target adoption. We address this question in the remaining of this
section. We first plot the subsidies and the supplier’s profit as a function of the standard deviation
of the noise that represents a measure of the demand uncertainty magnitude.
More precisely, we plot in Figure 4 the relative differences in subsidies (i.e., rsto−rdet
rdet
) as well
as the supplier’s profit as a function of the target level Γ (or equivalently, the expected sales) for
different standard deviations of the additive noise varying from 35 to 5,500. For Γ = 3,500, this
is equivalent to a coefficient of variation varying between 0.01 and 1.57. As expected, one can see
from Figure 4 that as the standard deviation of demand increases, the optimal subsidy is larger
whereas the supplier’s profit is lower. As a result, demand uncertainty benefits consumers at the
expense of hurting both the government and the supplier.
Figure 4 Relative normalized differences in subsidies (a) and supplier’s profit (b)
Finally, we analyze by how much the government will miss the actual target level (now Γ is fixed
and equal to 3,500) by using the optimal policy assuming demand is deterministic, rdet, instead
of using rsto. Recall that rsto ≥ rdet. In other words, the government assumes a simple average
deterministic demand model whereas in reality demand is uncertain. In particular, this allows us to
quantify the value of using a more sophisticated model that takes into account demand uncertainty
instead of simply ignoring it. Note that this analysis is different from the previous comparisons in
this paper, where we compared the optimal decisions as a function of demand uncertainty. Here, we
assume that demand is uncertain with some given distribution but the government decides to ignore
the uncertainty. To this extent, we consider two possible cases according to the modeling assumption
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of the supplier. First, we assume that the supplier is non-sophisticated, in the sense that he uses
an average demand approximation model as well (i.e., no information on demand distribution is
used). In this case, both the supplier and the government assume an average deterministic demand
but in reality demand is random. Second, the supplier is more sophisticated. Namely, the supplier
optimizes (over both p and q) by using a stochastic demand model together with the distribution
information. The results are presented in Figure 5, where we vary the value of the coefficient
of variation of the noise from 0 to 0.7. When the government and the supplier are both non-
Figure 5 Expected sales relative to target
sophisticated, the government can potentially save money (by under-subsidizing) and still gets
close to the target in expectation when demand uncertainty is not very large. As expected, when
the supplier has more information on demand distribution (as it is usually the case), the expected
sales are farther from the target and the government could miss the target level significantly. If in
addition, demand uncertainty is large (i.e., coefficient of variation larger than 1), the government
misses the target in both cases.
One can formalize the previous comparison analytically by quantifying the gap by which the
government misses the target by ignoring demand uncertainty. In particular, let us consider the
additive demand model given in (8).
Proposition 4. Consider that the government ignores demand uncertainty when designing con-
sumer subsidies.
1. The government misses the adoption target (in expectation) regardless of whether the supplier
is sophisticated or not.
2. The exact gaps are given by:
• For non-sophisticated supplier:
E
[
min(q,D(z, ))
]
= Γ +E
[
min(0, )
]≤ Γ. (28)
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• For sophisticated supplier, assuming a linear demand model:
E
[
min(q,D(z, ))
]
= Γ +
1
2
·E
[
min(F−1
(p∗− c
p∗
)
, )
]
≤ Γ. (29)
3. For low (high) profit margins, the gap is larger (smaller) when the supplier is sophisticated
(non-sophisticated).
p∗ denotes the optimal price set by the supplier. Note that all the results of Proposition 4 (with
the exception of equation (29)) are valid for a general demand model. Nevertheless, when the
supplier is sophisticated, one needs to assume a specific model (in our case, linear) in order to
compute the expected sales. As expected, the previous analysis suggests that the target adoption
will be missed by a higher margin as demand becomes more uncertain. When comparing the
non-sophisticated and sophisticated cases, one can see that in the former the government misses
the target by E
[
min(0, )
]
, whereas in the latter by 1
2
·E
[
min(F−1
(
p∗−c
p∗
)
, )
]
. Consequently, this
difference depends not only on the distribution of the noise but also on the profit margin. Since
the EV industry has rather low profit margins, the gap may be much larger when the supplier is
sophisticated. Indeed, the sophisticated supplier decreases the price (relative to pdet). In addition,
he reduces the production quantities as he is not willing to bear significant over-stock risk due
to the low profit margin. As a result, the expected sales are lower and therefore the government
misses the adoption target level. In conclusion, this analysis suggests that policy makers should
take into account demand uncertainty when designing consumer subsidies. Indeed, by ignoring
demand uncertainty, one can significantly miss the desired adoption target.
8. Conclusions
We propose a model to analyze the interaction between the government and the supplier when
designing consumer subsidy policies. Subsidies are often introduced at the early adoption stages of
green technologies to help them become economically viable faster. Given the high level of uncer-
tainty in these early stages, we hope to have shed some light on how demand uncertainty affects
consumer subsidy policies, as well as price and production quantity decisions from manufacturers
and the end consumers.
In practice, policy makers often ignore demand uncertainty and consider only deterministic
forecasts of adoption when designing subsidies. We demonstrate that uncertainty will significantly
change how these programs should be designed. In particular, we show by how much the government
misses the adoption target by ignoring demand volatility. Among some of our main insights, we
show that the profit margins and the shape of the demand curve will determine who bears demand
uncertainty risk. When demand is uncertain, quantities produced will be higher and the effective
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price for consumers will be lower. For convex demand functions prices will be lower, leading to
lower industry profits.
Focusing on the linear demand model, we can derive further insights. For instance, to compensate
for uncertain demand, quantities produced and subsidy levels are shifted by a function of the service
level, i.e., the profitability of the product. For highly profitable products, the supplier will absorb
most of the demand risk. When profit margins are smaller, the government will need to increase
the subsidy amount and pay a larger share for the risk.
When evaluating the uncertainty impact on consumers, we must consider the trade-off between
lower effective prices and the probability of a stock-out (unserved demand). We again show that the
shape of the demand curve plays an important role. For linear demand, consumers will ultimately
benefit from demand uncertainty. This is not the case, for instance, with an iso-elastic demand
model, where the possibility of not serving customers with high valuations will out-weight the
benefits of decreased prices.
We also compare the optimal policies to the case where a central planner manages jointly the
supplier and the government and tries to optimize the entire system simultaneously. We show that
the optimal effective price and production level coincide in both the decentralized and centralized
models. Consequently, the subsidy mechanism is sufficient to coordinate the government and the
supplier and the collusion does not hurt consumers in terms of price and quantities.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. 1. Equations (10) and (11) are obtained by applying the first order conditions on the objective
function of problem (1) with respect to q and then to p.
2. We next prove the second claim about the fact that tha optimal solution of the government problem is
obtained when the target adoption level is exactly met. Using condition (9), one can compute the optimal
value of p∗(r) by using a binary search algorithm (note that equation (10) is monotonic in p for any given
value of r). In particular, for any given r, there exists a single value p∗(r) that satisfies the optimal equation
(10) and since all the involved functions are continuous, we may also conclude that p∗(r) is a continuous well
defined function. As a result, the objective function of the government when using the optimal policy of the
supplier is also a continuous function of r. In addition, the target level cannot be attained when r = 0 by
Assumption 1. We then conclude that the optimal solution of the government problem is obtained when the
inequality target constraint is tight. In addition, one can see that the expected adoption target equation is
monotonic in r so that one can solve it by applying a binary section method.
3. Finally, let us show the third part. For the deterministic demand model, we have: qdet = y(zdet) = Γ. On
the other hand, when demand is stochastic, we have E
[
min(qsto,D(zsto, ))
]
= Γ so that we obtain: qsto ≥ qdet.
In addition, the above expression yields: y(zsto) = Γ−K(psto)≥ Γ. Therefore, we obtain: y(zsto)≥ y(zdet).
Since y(z) is non-increasing with respect to z = p − r (from Assumption 1), we may infer the following
relation for the effective price: zdet ≥ zsto. We next compute the optimal price for the deterministic model
pdet by differentiating the supplier’s objective function with respect to p and equate it to zero (first order
condition):
∂
∂pdet
[
qdet · (pdet− c)
]
= y′(zdet) · (pdet− c) + y(zdet) = 0.
One can see that in both models, we have obtained the same optimal equation for the price: y(z) =−y′(z) ·
(p−c). Namely, the optimal price satisfies: p= c+ Γ|y′(z)| . We note that the previous expression is not a closed
form expression as both sides depend on the optimal price p. This is not an issue as our goal here is to compare
the optimal quantities in the two models rather than deriving the closed form expressions. Assuming that
the deterministic part of demand y(z) is a convex function, we know that y′(z) is a non-decreasing function
and then: 0 > y′(zdet) ≥ y′(zsto). We then have the following inequality for the optimal prices: psto ≤ pdet.
We note that the optimal subsidy in both models does not follow such a clear relation and it will actually
depend on the specific demand function. We next proceed to compare the optimal supplier’s profit in both
models. For the deterministic demand model, the optimal profit is given by: Πdet = qdet · (pdet− c) = Γ2|y′(zdet)| .
In the stochastic model, the expression of the optimal profit is given by:
Πsto = psto ·E
[
min(qsto,D(zsto, ))
]− c · qsto = Γ2|y′(zsto)| − c · (qsto−Γ)≤Πdet.

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The Price Taker Model
Consider a firm that faces a stochastic demand D for its product and must decide upon production q before
observing demand. This framework is known as the newsvendor problem and was extensively studied in
the literature (see, e.g., Porteus (1990)). In this section, we consider the case where the selling price p is
exogenously given (price taker setting) and we derive the solutions of problems (2) and (1). The problem is
modeled as a two-stage game and can be solved sequentially by backward induction. Given a subsidy level r,
the optimal solution of problem (1) may be obtained similarly to the newsvendor problem and is given by:
q∗(z) = F−1
D(z,)
(p− c
p
)
. (30)
Here, F−1
D(z,)
(
p−c
p
)
denotes the inverse Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of the random demand
evaluated at the quantile p−c
p
. We note however that the supplier’s production q∗(z) depends on the value
of the effective price z through demand. We next impose the following assumption on demand.
Assumption 3. The function D(z, ) is positive, decreasing and continuous with respect to z (note that
here p is fixed so that decreasing with z translates to increasing with r) for any realization of the noise . By
this, we mean that the corresponding CDF is a decreasing function of z:
FD(z1,)(x)<FD(z2,)(x); ∀z1 = p− r1 < z2 = p− r2
In addition, E
[
D(p, )
]
< Γ for the given price p and r = 0. That is, the target adoption level cannot be
achieved without subsidies (otherwise, the problem is not relevant).
The first part of Assumption 3 is a special case of the first-order stochastic dominance where for each value of
z, D(z, ) is viewed as a different random variable. Using Assumption 3, we prove formally (see details below)
that the optimal subsidy of problem (2) is obtained when the target adoption level constraint is binding.
As a result, one can find the optimal solution of problem (2) by using the tightness of the target adoption
constraint. In addition, the optimal effective price z∗ can be computed efficiently by using a bisection search
method (see details below). One can then compute q∗(z∗) using equation (30).
In particular, by substituting the expression for q∗(z) from (30) to the government’s problem, the govern-
ment leads the game by solving the following optimization problem:
min
z
r ·E[min(q∗(z),D(z, ))]
s.t. E
[
min(q∗(z),D(z, ))
]≥ Γ (31)
r≥ 0
Note that the problem above is a single variable optimization problem in the subsidy z (since p is fixed,
the real decision is in fact r or equivalently z = p− r). Note also that we impose a non-negative constraint
on the consumer subsidies since the target adoption cannot be achieved with r= 0. However, even for simple
demand functions, this problem is not necessarily convex. In addition as the overall problem is a bi-level
optimization problem (that is, the government problem takes into consideration the production quantities
set by the supplier) the overall problem is hard.
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We next compare the optimal decision variables when demand is stochastic relative to the case of a
deterministic average approximation. We use the subscripts ”sto” and ”det” to denote the optimal variables
for the stochastic and deterministic models respectively. For simplicity, we consider an additive uncertainty
in the following form:
D(z, ) = y(z) + .
Here, y(z) =E
[
D(z, )
]
is a function of the effective price z = p− r and represents the nominal deterministic
part of demand whereas  is a random variable with zero mean. Assumption 3 implies that y(z) is decreasing
with respect to z. We next present the comparison between considering explicitly demand uncertainty relative
to the case where demand is just approximated by its average value. The results are summarized in the
following Theorem.
Theorem 5. Under Assumption 3, we have:
zsto = p− rsto ≤ zdet = p− rdet
qsto ≥ qdet
rsto ≥ rdet
Expsto ≥ Expdet
Πsto ≤ Πdet
Π and Exp denote the supplier profit and government expenditures respectively.
Proof. For the deterministic model, one can obtain that the optimal solution satisfies: qdet = y(zdet) = Γ.
When demand is stochastic, we have E
[
min(qsto,D(zsto, ))
]
= Γ so that: qsto ≥ qdet. In addition, the above
expression yields: y(zsto) = Γ−E
[
min(F−1
(
p−c
p
)
, )
]≥ Γ. Therefore, we have: y(zsto)≥ y(zdet). Now, since
y(z) is assumed to be a non-increasing function of z = p− r (from Assumption 3), we may infer the following
relation about the effective price: zdet ≥ zsto. Therefore, we also have: rsto ≥ rdet. The government expenditures
are equal to the optimal subsidies multiplied by the expected sales. Since for both deterministic and stochastic
demands, the expected sales are equal exactly to the target level Γ, we conclude that: Expsto ≥Expdet. We
next proceed to compare the optimal profit of the supplier in both models. For the deterministic model, the
optimal profit is given by: Πdet = qdet · (p− c) = Γ · (p− c). In the stochastic model, the expression of the
optimal profit is given by: Πsto = p ·E
[
min(qsto,D(zsto, ))
]− c · qsto = p ·Γ− c · qsto ≤Πdet. 
For a general decreasing demand function in terms of the effective price p−r (since in this case the price p
is fixed, demand is increasing with r), uncertainty benefits the consumers in the sense that the price is lower
and the produced quantities are higher. However, both the government and the supplier are worse-off when
demand is uncertain. We observe that for the price taker model considered here, the results do not depend
on the structure of demand as long as it satisfies Assumption 3. In other words, the results of Theorem 5 are
robust with respect to the form of the demand function. The case where the noise is multiplicative also leads
to the same set of results but is not presented here due to space limitations. Remember that for the price
setter model presented in Section 4, the results actually do depend on the underlying demand structure.
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Proof of the tightness of the constraint for the price taker model
Proof. First, we show that the objective function in problem (31) is a non-decreasing function with respect
to the subsidy r. Then, since we are minimizing a non-decreasing function subject to an inequality constraint
and a non-negativity constraint, the optimal solution will be obtained by the tightness of the adoption
constraint. The stochastic demand function D(z, ) is assumed to be a strictly decreasing and continuous
function of z (see Assumption 3). By this, we mean that the corresponding CDF is a decreasing function of
r: FD(z1)(x)< FD(z2)(x); ∀z1 = p− r1 < z2 = p− r2. Namely, if r increases (and therefore z decreases), the
investment becomes more subsidized and hence more profitable. Consequently, demand tends to increase too
and therefore the CDF decreases since it represents the following probability: FD(z,)(x) = P(D(z, ) ≤ x).
Regarding the optimal inventory level q∗(r), we have obtained that:
q∗(z) = F−1
D(z,)
(p− c
p
)
. (32)
We next show that the expression in (32) is decreasing with respect to z.
Lemma 1. Under Assumption 3, the expression of q∗(z) in (32) is an decreasing function of z.
Proof. Let us take two different values z1 and z2 such that z1 < z2. As we previously explained, from
Assumption 3 we have: FD(z1,)(x)<FD(z2,)(x). By using the non-decreasing property of the CDF, we have:
FD(z,)(x1)≥ FD(z,)(x2); ∀x1 ≥ x2. Recall that we want to show that: F−1D(z1,)(t)>F−1D(z2,)(t). Let us denote:
y1 , F−1D(z1,)(t); y2 , F
−1
D(z2,)
(t). Now, let us assume by contradiction that: y1 ≤ y2. Then, we have:{
FD(z1,)(y1) = FD(z1,)
(
F−1
D(z1,)
(t)
)
= t
FD(z2,)(y2) = FD(z2,)
(
F−1
D(z2,)
(t)
)
= t
However, t= FD(z2,)(y2)>FD(z1,)(y2)≥ FD(z1,)(y1) = t and this is a contradiction. 
We next look at the expected sales, E
[
min(q∗(z),D(z, ))
]
as a function of z.
Lemma 2. The function E
[
min(q∗(z),D(z, ))
]
is a non-increasing function with respect to z.
Proof. Let us define the following (non-negative) random variable as a function of z: W (z) =
min(q∗(z),D(z, )). Then, its CDF is given by:
FW (z)(x) = P(W (z)≤ x) = P
(
min(q∗(z),D(z, ))≤ x)={1, if q∗(z)≤ x
P(D(z, )≤ x) = FD(z,)(x), if q∗(z)>x
Using the result from Lemma 1, we can see that FW (z)(x) is a non-decreasing function of z. We next compute
the desired expectation using the following relation:
E
[
min(q∗(z),D(z, ))
]
=E
[
W (z)
]
=
∫ [
1−FW (z)(x)
]
dx.
Since we have shown that FW (z)(x) is a non-decreasing function of z, we conclude that the integrand is
non-increasing in z and the desired result follows. 
In conclusion, we have shown that the objective function is a non-increasing function of z and therefore the
optimal minimizing solution is obtained when the target constraint is exactly met.
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We next show that the optimal solution zsto can be computed efficiently and derive the optimal equation
to be solved. By using the tightness of the target constraint, we obtain:
E
[
min(q∗(zsto),D(zsto, ))
]
= Γ. (33)
Here, zsto denotes the optimal effective price. Since the price p is fixed, the quantile
p−c
p
is fixed too and
therefore F−1
D(z,)(·) is only a function of z. One can further simplify equation (33) as follows:
q∗ · [1−FD(zsto,)(q∗)]+E[D(zsto, )|D(zsto, )≤ q∗] ·FD(zsto,)(q∗) = Γ.
Since FD(zsto,)(q
∗) = p−c
p
, we obtain: c
p
· q∗ + p−c
p
· E[D(zsto, )|D(zsto, ) ≤ q∗] = Γ. Note that:
E
[
D(zsto, )|D(zsto, )≤ q∗
]
= p
p−c ·
∫ q∗
0
x · fD(zsto,)(x)dx. Here, fD(zsto,)(x) represents the Probability Den-
sity Function (PDF) of the random demand D(z, ) evaluated at z = p− rsto. Finally, since cp · q∗ +
∫ q∗
0
x ·
fD(zsto,)(x)dx= Γ, using integration by parts, we obtain:∫ q∗
0
x · fD(zsto,)(x)dx= x ·FD(zsto,)(x)
∣∣∣∣∣
q∗
0
−
∫ q∗
0
FD(zsto,)(x)dx
= q∗ · p− c
p
−
∫ q∗
0
FD(zsto,)(x)dx.
Therefore: q∗− ∫ q∗
0
FD(zsto,)(x)dx= Γ. Since q
∗ = F−1
D(zsto,)
(
p−c
p
)
, we obtain the following optimal equation
for zsto:
F−1
D(zsto,)
(p− c
p
)
−
∫ F−1
D(zsto,)
(
p−c
p
)
0
FD(zsto,)(x)dx= Γ. (34)
Equation (34) is a monotonic equation in zsto. Therefore, one can find the optimal effective price zsto from
the previous equation using a bisection search method. 
Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. For the linear demand model in (14), the optimal solution of the supplier’s optimization problem
has to satisfy the following first order condition:
d¯+α · (r+ c− 2p) + c
p
·F−1
(p− c
p
)
+
p− c
p
·E[|≤ F−1 (p− cp )]= 0.
Note that it does not seem easy to obtain a closed form solution for p∗(r). In addition, since the previous
equation is not monotone one cannot use a binary search method.
Instead, one can express r as a function of p: r = 2p − c − d¯
α
+ a·c
2
α·p2 . We next proceed to solve the
government optimization problem by using the tightness of the inequality target adoption constraint:
E
[
min(q∗(p∗(r), r),D(p∗(r)− r, ))]= α · (p∗(r)− c) = Γ. One very interesting conclusion from this analysis
is that we have a very simple closed form expression for the optimal price, that is the same than for the
deterministic case:
psto = pdet = c+
Γ
α
. (35)
We can at this point derive the optimal supplier’s profit for both models. In the deterministic case, the profit
of the supplier is given by: Πdet = qdet · (pdet− c) = Γ2α . In the stochastic model, the optimal profit is given by:
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Πsto = psto ·E
[
min(qsto,D(zsto, )
]− c · qsto = Γ2α − c · (qsto−Γ)≤Πdet. We next derive the optimal production
level for both models. In the deterministic case, we obtained that: qdet = Γ. For the stochastic case, after
substituting all the corresponding expressions we obtain:
qsto = d¯+α · (rsto− psto) +F−1
(psto− c
psto
)
= Γ +F−1
(psto− c
psto
)
−K(psto)≥ qdet.
We finally compare the effect of demand uncertainty on the optimal subsidy. One can show after some
appropriate manipulations that the optimal subsidy for the deterministic linear demand model is given by:
rdet =
2Γ
α
− d¯
α
+ c. For the stochastic demand model, we have the following optimal equation: α · (2psto −
rsto − c)− d¯ = K(psto). Hence, one can find the expression for the optimal subsidies as a function of the
optimal price psto: rsto = 2psto − c− d¯α − 1α ·K(psto). By replacing: psto = c+ Γα from (35), we obtain: rsto =
2Γ
α
+ c− d¯
α
− 1
α
·K(psto) = rdet− 1α ·K(psto)≥ rdet. 
Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. 1. We provide the proof of Corollary 1.1 by using the facts dρ
dc
≤ 0 and dρ
cΓ
≥ 0. We then show
that the production gap widens as the service level ρ increases. Note that qsto − qdet = F−1 (ρ)−K(psto) =
E
[
max(F−1 (ρ)− ,0)
]
. Taking the derivative with respect to the cost c, we obtain:
d(qsto− qdet)
dc
=
d
(
F−1 (ρ)
)
dρ
· dρ
dc
· ρ= 1
f(F−1 (ρ))
· dρ
dc
· ρ≤ 0.
Similarly, for the target level Γ:
d(qsto− qdet)
dΓ
=
d
(
F−1 (ρ)
)
dρ
· dρ
dΓ
· ρ= 1
f(F−1 (ρ))
· dρ
dΓ
· ρ≥ 0.
2. To prove Corollary 1.2, we show that the subsidy gap decreases with respect to ρ. Note that rsto−rdet =
−K(psto)/α=−E
[
min(F−1 (ρ), )
]
/α. Taking the derivative with respect to the cost c, we obtain:
d(rsto− rdet)
dc
=− 1
α
[d(F−1 (ρ))
dρ
· dρ
dc
· (1− ρ)
]
=− 1
α
· 1
f(F−1 (ρ))
· dρ
dc
· (1− ρ)≥ 0.
Similarly, for the target level Γ:
d(rsto− rdet)
dΓ
=− 1
α
[d(F−1 (ρ))
dρ
· dρ
dΓ
· (1− ρ)
]
=− 1
α
· 1
f(F−1 (ρ))
· dρ
dΓ
· (1− ρ)≤ 0.
3. We next present the proof of Corollary 1.3. We assume that  is an additive random variable with
support [a1, a2], not necessarily with a symmetric PDF. For the linear demand model from (14), we have:
rsto = rdet− 1
α
·K(psto). (36)
First, let us prove the first inequality by showing that the term on the right in equation (36) is non-positive
for a general parameter y. We have: E
[
min(y, )
]
= y · P(y ≤ ) + E[| < y] · P( < y). Now, let us divide
the analysis into two different cases according to the sign of y. If y ≤ 0, we obtain: E[min(y, )]= y ·P(y ≤
) + P( < y) · E[| < y] ≤ 0. In the previous equation, both terms are non-positive. For the case where
y > 0, we have: E
[
min(y, )
]
< E[] = 0. Therefore, E
[
min(F−1
(
p−c
p
)
, )
] ≤ 0, showing the first inequality:
rdet ≤ rsto. We now show the second inequality. We know from the optimality that: p≥ c. Let us evaluate the
expression of rsto in (36) for different values of p. If p= c, we obtain: F
−1

(
p−c
p
)
= F−1 (0) = a1 < 0. Then,
we have: rsto = rdet− 1α ·E
[
min(a1, )
]
= rdet− a1α > rdet. If p c, we obtain: F−1
(
p−c
p
)
→ F−1 (1) = a2 > 0.
Therefore, we obtain: rsto → rdet − 1α · E
[
min(a2, )
]
= rdet − 1α · E[] = rdet. Since rsto is continuous and
non-increasing in p for any p≥ c, the second inequality holds. 
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Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. By applying a similar methodology as in the proof of Theorem 1, one can derive the following
expressions (the steps are not reported for conciseness):
qdet = Γ; qsto > Γ
pdet = c+
1
α
·
(
d¯
Γ
) 1
α
; psto =
F−1
(
psto−c
psto
)
K(psto)
c+
1
α
·
( d¯
Γ
·K(psto)
) 1
α
rdet = c+
(
d¯
Γ
) 1
α ·
(
1
α
− 1
)
; rsto =
F−1
(
psto−c
psto
)
K(psto)
c+
( d¯
Γ
·K(psto)
) 1
α ·
( 1
α
− 1
)
Here, K(psto) = E
[
min(F−1
(
psto−c
psto
)
, )
]
, so that the above expressions for psto and rsto are not in closed
form. Indeed, in this case, one cannot analytically derive a closed form expression. However, we are still able
to compare the optimal subsidy between the deterministic and stochastic settings. Since E[] = 1 and ≥ 0,
we have 0≤K(psto)≤ 1. Consequently, one can see that: since α> 1: rsto ≥ rdet. 
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. For the linear additive demand model presented in (14), one can compute the consumer surplus
for given values of p, r and q:
CSsto() =
{
D(z,)2
2α
; if D(z, )≤ q
D(z,)·q
2α
; if D(z, )> q
=
D(z, )
2α
· [min(D(z, ), q)].
Therefore, we have: CSsto()≥
[
min(D(z,),q)
]2
2α
. By applying the expectation operator, we obtain:
E
[
CSsto()
]≥ E
{[
min(D(z, ), q)
]2}
2α
≥
{
E
[
min(D(z, ), q)
]}2
2α
=
Γ2
2α
=CSdet.
Where, the second inequality follows by Jensen’s inequality (or the fact that the variance of any random
variable is always non-negative). The last equality follows from the previous result that the target inequality
constraint is tight at optimality.
We next compute the consumer surplus defined in (19) for the iso-elastic demand from (17). In particular,
we observe that zmax() =∞ for any value of  (if we assume that  is strictly positive and finite). In addition,
we have: zsto = psto − rsto =
[
d¯
Γ
· K(psto)
] 1
α . Note that K(psto) is a deterministic constant and does not
depend on the realization of the noise . Therefore, when computing CSsto() for a given , since demand is
multiplicative with respect to the noise, one can see that  cancels out and that simplifies the calculation. We
obtain: CSsto() =
1
α−1 ·
[
d¯
Γ
·K(psto)
] 1−α
α ·
[
d¯
Γ
·K(psto)
]
·min (D(zsto, ), qsto). Then, by taking the expectation
operator, we obtain: E[CSsto()] = d¯α−1 ·
(
d¯
Γ
) 1−α
α · (K(psto)) 1α = CSdet ·
[
K(psto)
] 1
α . Here, we have used the
fact that the inequality adoption constraint is tight at optimality, that is: E
[
min
(
D(zsto, ), qsto
)
] = Γ. In
addition, this is the only term that depends on the noise . Since we have 0≤K(psto)≤ 1, one conclude that
for any α> 1: E[CSsto()]≤CSdet. 
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Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. We present first the proof for the deterministic demand model and then the one for stochastic
demand. Let us first consider the unconstrained optimization problem faced by the central planner. If demand
is deterministic, the objective function is given by: J(p, r) = q(p, r) · (p− r − c). We assume that demand
is a function of the effective price (denoted by z), that is: q(p, r) = y(p− r) = y(z). Next, we compute the
unconstrained optimal solution denote by z∗ by imposing the first order condition: dJ(z)
dz
= 0⇒ z∗ = c− y(z∗)
y′(z∗) .
Although, we did not derive a closed form expression for z∗, we know that it should satisfy the above
fixed point equation. We now show that any unconstrained optimal solution is infeasible for the constrained
original problem since it violates the target inequality constraint:
q(p∗, r∗) = y(z∗) = y
(
c− y(z
∗)
y′(z∗)
)
≤ y(c)< Γ.
We used the facts that demand is positive, differentiable and a decreasing function of the effective price (see
Assumption 1). In addition, since we assumed that the target level cannot be achieved without subsidies, we
have shown that the unconstrained optimal solution is not feasible. Therefore, we conclude that the target
inequality constraint has to be tight at optimality, namely: q(pdet, rdet) = Γ. In other words, the optimal
effective price and production level are the same than in the decentralized model.
We now proceed to present the proof for the case where demand is stochastic. Let us consider the constrained
optimization problem faced by the central planner. We denote by J the objective function (multiplied by
minus 1) and by: λi; i = 1,2,3 the corresponding KKT multipliers of the three constraints. The KKT
optimality conditions are then given by:
∂J
∂q
−λ2 ·P(q≤D) = 0; ∂J
∂p
−λ1−A ·λ2 = 0; ∂J
∂r
−λ3−B ·λ2 = 0 (37)
Here, A and B are given by:
A =
∂
∂p
E
[
min(q,D(z, ))
]
= y′(z) ·FD(z,)(q)
B =
∂
∂r
E
[
min(q,D(z, ))
]
=−y′(z) ·FD(z,)(q) =−A
If in addition the noise is additive, we have: FD(z,)(q) = F(q− y(z)). We also have:
∂J
∂q
= c− z · [1−FD(z,)(q)]; ∂J
∂p
=−E[min(q,D(z, ))]− z ·A=−∂J
∂r
We note that the last two equations are symmetric and hence equivalent. Equivalently, the central planner
decides only upon the effective price z = p − r and not p and r separately. We next assume that λ1 =
λ3 = 0. This corresponds (from the complementary slackness conditions) to assume that both corresponding
constraints are not tight. Indeed, clearly the optimal subsidies may be assumed to be strictly positive since
we assumed that when r= 0, the adoption constraint cannot be satisfied. We further assume that the supplier
wants to achieve positive profits, so that the optimal price is strictly larger than the cost. Therefore, the
KKT conditions (both stationarity and complementary slackness) can be written as follows:
c −(z+λ2) · [1−F(q− y(z))] = 0 (38)
− (z−λ2) · y′(z) ·F(q− y(z)) =E
[
min(q,D(z, ))
]
(39)
λ2 ·
(
Γ−E[min(q,D(z, ))])= 0 (40)
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We now have two possible cases depending on the value of λ2. Let us investigate first the case where λ2 = 0.
From equation (38), we have: F(q− y(z)) = z−cz . By using equation (39), we obtain: z = c−
E
[
min(q,D(z,))
]
y′(z) .
Now, we have: E
[
min(q,D(z, ))
]
= y
(
c − E
[
min(q,D(z,))
]
y′(z)
)
+ E
[
min(F−1
(
p−c
p
)
, )
]
. Since we assume that
the function y(z) is a decreasing function of the effective price z and that both q and D(z, ) are non-
negative, we obtain: E
[
min(q,D(z, ))
]
< y(c) +E
[
min(F−1
(
p−c
p
)
, )
]≤ y(c). In the last step, we used the
fact that E
[
min(F−1
(
p−c
p
)
, )
]≤ 0. Therefore, we conclude that: E[min(q,D(z, ))]< Γ. In other words, the
solution is not feasible since it violates the target inequality constraint. Hence, we must have λ2 > 0 and the
inequality constraint is tight at optimality: E
[
min(q,D(z, ))
]
= Γ. Now, by using equation (38), we obtain:
F(q − y(z)) = z+λ2−cz+λ2 . We then substitute the above expression in equation (39): z = c− λ2 − Γy′(z) . Now,
we have: Γ = y(z) +E
[
min(F−1
(
z+λ2−c
z+λ2
)
, )
]
. By expressing the previous equation in terms of the effective
price, we obtain: Γ = y(z) + E
[
min(F−1
( − Γ
y′(z)
c− Γ
y′(z)
)
, )
]
. Therefore, one can solve the previous equation and
find the optimal effective price z. We note that this is exactly the same equation as in the decentralized case,
so that the effective prices are the same. The optimal production levels are given by: q= y(z)+F−1
( − Γ
y′(z)
c− Γ
y′(z)
)
.
Similarly, the equations are the same in both the decentralized and centralized models so that the optimal
production levels are identical. Finally, we just need to show that λ2 > 0 in order to complete the proof. We
have:
Γ = y
(
c−λ2− Γ
y′(z)
)
+E
[
min(F−1
( − Γ
y′(z)
c− Γ
y′(z)
)
, )
]≤ y(c−λ2− Γ
y′(z)
)
< y
(
c−λ2
)
If we assume by contradiction that λ2 < 0, we obtain: Γ< y
(
c− λ2
)
< y(c). This is a contradiction so that:
λ2 > 0 and the proof is complete. 
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. We first consider the scenario where the supplier is non-sophisticated. In this case, the optimal
decision variables are still rdet, qdet and pdet. However, in reality demand is uncertain and therefore the
expected sales are given by:
E
[
min(qdet,D(zdet, ))
]
=E
[
min(qdet, y(zdet) + )
]
= Γ +E
[
min(0, )
]≤ Γ. (41)
Here, we have used the fact that: qdet = y(zdet) = Γ.
Next, we assume that the supplier is sophisticated. Note that in this case, the optimal subsidies set by
the government are still equal to rdet. In other words, the government does not have any distributional
information on demand uncertainty and believes neither does the supplier. In particular, the subsidies are
set such that: y(pdet−rdet) = Γ. However, the supplier is sophisticated in the sense that he uses distributional
information on demand uncertainty in order to decide the optimal price and production. In a similar way as
in equations (10) and (11) from Theorem 1, the optimal price when r= rdet can be obtain as the solution of
the following non-linear equation:
y(p− rdet) +E
[
min(F−1
(p− c
p
)
, )
]
+ y′(p− rdet) · (p− c) = 0. (42)
In addition,one can compute the optimal production level as follows:
q∗(p, rdet) = y(p− rdet) +F−1
(p− c
p
)
.
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For the linear demand model, equation (42) becomes: d¯ − α · (2p − rdet − c) + E
[
min(F−1
(
p−c
p
)
, )
]
= 0.
Equivalently, the optimal price denoted by p∗ follows the following relation:
p∗ = c+
Γ
α
+
1
2α
·E[min(F−1 (p∗− cp∗ ), )].
Note that the optimal price when demand is deterministic is equal to pset = c+
Γ
α
and therefore: p∗ ≤ pdet.
As a result, the expected demand is given by:
y(p∗− rdet) = d¯−α · (p∗− rdet) = Γ− 1
2
·E[min(F−1 (p∗− cp∗ ), )]≥ Γ.
We next proceed to compute the expected sales:
E
[
min
(
q∗,D(p∗− rdet, )
)]
=E
[
min
(
y(p∗− rdet) +F−1
(p− c
p
)
, y(p∗− rdet) + 
)]
= Γ +
1
2
·E
[
min(F−1
(p∗− c
p∗
)
, )
]
≤ Γ.

